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INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-A SUBROGATION CLAUSE IN A HEALTH
INSURANCE POLICY IS ENFORCEABLE EVEN THOUGH THE INSURED
HAS NOT BEEN MADE WHOLE. Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 312 Ark. 199 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas Supreme Court held, in Higginbotham v. Arkansas
Blue Cross & Blue Shield,' that a subrogation clause in a group
health insurance policy entitled the insurer to subrogation despite
the fact that the insured had not been "made whole" for his 1oss.2
This decision departs from the court's earlier view established in
1914 in Cowling v. Britt3 and reiterated in 1980 in Cooper Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Northwestern National Casualty Co. ,4 that subrogation
is an equitable doctrine and that equitable principles generally govern
its application. In Higginbotham, the court ignored the equitable
doctrines that normally apply to subrogation cases and enforced a
contract provision that provided for subrogation even before the
insured had been made whole.' Although this approach departs from
the traditional view of subrogation taken in Arkansas, it conforms
to the more restrictive view of subrogation taken by the court in
a line of cases interpreting medical insurance contracts and subro-
gation rights. 6 When it adopted this position, the Arkansas Supreme
Court placed Arkansas in the ranks of the substantial minority7 of
jurisdiction that hold that the right to contract is superior to the
equitable doctrines that traditionally govern subrogation. 8
1. 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d 464 (1993).
2. Id.
3. 114 Ark. 175, 183, 169 S.W. 783, 785 (1914).
4. 268 Ark. 334, 335, 595 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1980).
5. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 203, 849 S.W.2d at 466.
6. See American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ark. 254, 753 S.W.2d
530 (1988)(denying subrogation to health insurance carriers because the policy did
not contain a subrogation clause); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Northwestern
Nat. Cas. Co., 268 Ark. 334, 595 S.W.2d 938 (1980)(holding that the insurer was
not entitled to subrogation because the ambiguous language of the subrogation
clause in the insurance policy required that it be construed in favor of the insured);
Shipley v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d 268 (1968)(holding
that subrogation clauses in health insurance policies are valid and enforceable);
Storey v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 17 Ark. App. 112, 704 S.W.2d
176 (1986)(applying contract law principles to subrogation clauses in health insurance
contracts).
7. Dino A. Ross, Subrogation and the Right to First Priority in Settlement
Proceeds, 22 CoLo. LAW. 71, 72 (1993).
8. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 203, 849 S.W.2d at 466.
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In its broadest context, subrogation refers to the equitable right
of a third party to exercise all the rights available to a particular
creditor, to whom the third party has made payment on behalf of
a debtor, against the debtor. 9 Clauses permitting subrogation com-
monly appear in insurance and construction contracts, and subro-
gation also appears in suretyship and negotiable instrument law.' 0
In the context of insurance law, subrogation allows an insurance
company to pursue recovery from a third party who is or may be
liable to the insured for the damages paid by the insurer." Arkansas
courts have recognized two basic doctrines of subrogation with respect
to insurance law: conventional subrogation and subrogation by op-
eration of law, also known as legal subrogation.' 2
Under the doctrine of conventional subrogation, an insurer's
subrogation right arises from an express clause in the insurance
policy or settlement agreement.' 3 In contrast, the doctrine of legal
subrogation is based solely on equitable principles due to the absence
of any contractual provision, and it arises when an insurer, pursuant
to an insurance contract, pays a claim owed by a third party. 14 The
distinction between conventional and legal subrogation usually has
no practical significance since the facts giving rise to legal subrogation
are typically the same facts that entitle a person to claim the benefits
of a contract clause providing for subrogation. 15 However, in some
situations, such as the one that arose in Higginbotham, the distinction
defines the rights of the parties.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990). For example, when an
automobile insurance company pays for the damage to an automobile caused by
the negligence of another, the insurance company is entitled to collect the amount
of its payment from the at-fault party or his insurance company.
10. Id.
ii. GEORGE J. C -, C OUCH ON INSURANCE § 61:1 (2d ed. 1983).
12. See Rogers, 296 Ark. 254, 753 S.W.2d 530 (1988); Cooper Tire & Rubber,
268 Ark. 334, 595 S.W.2d 938 (1980); Shipley, 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d 268
(1968); Baker v. Leigh, 238 Ark. 918, 385 S.W.2d 790 (1965); Federal Land Bank
v. Richland Farming Co., 180 Ark. 442, 21 S.W.2d 954 (1929); Southern Cotton
Oil Co. v. Napolean Hill Cotton Co., 108 Ark. 555, 158 S.W. 1092 (1913); Storey,
17 Ark. App. 112, 704 S.W.2d 176 (1986).
13. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WMISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(a) (student
ed. 1988). See also Rogers, 296 Ark. at 259, 753 S.W.2d at 533; Cooper Tire &
Rubber, 268 Ark. at 335, 595 S.W.2d at 939; Shipley, 244 Ark. at 1162, 428
S.W.2d at 270; Storey, 17 Ark. App. at 113-14, 704 S.W.2d at 177.
14. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:2; see also Baker, 238 Ark. at 923-24, 385
S.W.2d at 794 (quoting Southern Cotton Oil Co., 108 Ark. 555, 158 S.W. 1082
(1913)); Richland Farming Co., 180 Ark. at 445, 21 S.W.2d at 955; Southern
Cotton Oil Co., 108 Ark. at 558, 158 S.W. at 1083-84.
15. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:2.
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II. FACTS
Scott Higginbotham (hereinafter "Higginbotham") sustained se-
rious injuries in an automobile accident that resulted in multiple
fractures of the left elbow, a fracture of the right pelvis, and a
transverse fracture of the fifth lumbar vertebra. 16 Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield (hereinafter "Blue Cross") paid his medical
bills, totaling $11,482.08, pursuant to his father's health insurance
policy. 7 The policy contained a subrogation clause that entitled Blue
Cross to repayment of the amount paid by it for medical bills in
the event of recovery by the insured from a third party who caused
the injury.'8 Higginbotham accepted a settlement offer from the tort-
feasor's insurer, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter
"State Farm"), for the tortfeasor's policy limit of $25,000.00.' 9 As
part of the settlement, Higginbotham executed a release that relieved
both State Farm and its insured from any further liability. 20
Blue Cross demanded that Higginbotham repay the $11,482.00
it had expended on his behalf, citing the insurance policy's sub-
rogation clause as the basis for its claim .21 Higginbotham refused
and asserted that Blue Cross was not entitled to subrogation because
the $25,000.00 he received was not a sufficient sum to fully com-
pensate his loss. 22
Blue Cross filed suit to recover the $11,482.00, and both parties
filed summary judgment motions. 23 In support of his motion for
summary judgment, Higginbotham included affidavits from trial
lawyers estimating that his damages exceeded $50,000.00.24 Blue Cross
argued that the affidavits raised disputed fact questions that would
render summary disposition improper, but it asserted that the court
16. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 15, Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d 464 (1993).
17. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 200, 849 S.W.2d at 465.
18. Id. The full text of the clause is as follows:
In the event any benefits or services of any kind are furnished to you or
payment made or credit extended to or on behalf of any covered person
for a physical condition or injury caused by a third party or for which
a third party may be liable, the Plan shall be subrogated and shall succeed
to such covered person's rights of recovery against any such third party
to the full extent of the value of any such benefits or services furnished
or payments made or credits extended.
Id.
19. Id. It is unknown whether the settlement agreement specified what the
payment was for. Id. at 204, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (Brown, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 200, 849 S.W.2d at 465.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 200-01, 849 S.W.2d at 465.
23. Id. at 201, 849 S.W.2d at 465.
24. Id.
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could grant its motion for summary judgment without using the
affidavits by holding that Blue Cross was entitled to subrogation
regardless of whether Higginbotham had been made whole.25
The trial court held that, although the $25,000.00 did not fully
compensate Higginbotham for his injuries, Blue Cross was entitled
to subrogation under the terms of its contract. 26 The Arkansas Court
of Appeals certified the case, 27 and the Arkansas Supreme Court
accepted the case for review and affirmed the trial court's decision. 28
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Development of Insurance Subrogation
The doctrine of subrogation evolved from general principles of
equity. 29 Courts of equity developed subrogation to prevent the
insured from recovering, twice for the same injury 0 and to reimburse
a surety3 for the payments it made.32 At its inception, the granting
of a right to subrogation rested upon the principles of natural justice,
not contract law.33 Whether the doctrine of subrogation would be
applied in a particular case was decided according to principles of
equity, good conscience, and public policy.34 Subrogation was not
considered an absolute right, nor was it dependent upon a contract. 5
Instead, it was purely equitable in nature and would not be enforced
when to do so would produce inequitable results.36
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 200, 849 S.W.2d at 465. The Arkansas Supreme Court's jurisdiction
attached pursuant to the rule of Arkansas Supreme Court Procedure providing for
the certification of a case from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The
rule states that "[tihe Court of Appeals may certify any case appealed to the
Suprem-ne Court, if the Court of Appeals finds that the appealed case: . . . (b)
involves an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major im-
portance." R. SuP. CT. & CT. ApP. OF THE STATE OF ARK. 1-2(d).
28. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 204, 849 S.W.2d at 467.
29. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:20.
30. If the insured were allowed to recover from both the insurer and a third
party, such as a tort-feasor, then this double recovery would occur. Subrogation
prevents this.
31. A surety is one who is primarily liable for the debt or obligation of another.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (6th ed. 1990).
32. COUCH, supra note 11, §§ 61:18, 61:20; see also Shipley, 244 Ark. at 1162,
428 S.W.2d at 270.
33. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:20.
34. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:20.
35. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:20.
36. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:20; see also 11 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 6502 (1981).
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The historical application of these equitable principles to medical
and health insurance contracts that did not contain express subrogation
clauses generally resulted in a denial of subrogation rights.17 Even
the subrogation clauses contained in standard automobile insurance
policies did not apply to medical payments coverage until 1958.38 It
was not until approximately ten years ago that standard health
insurance policies began to include subrogation clauses.39
The question of whether subrogation clauses in medical and
health insurance contracts will be enforced has spawned three distinct
judicial viewpoints/ ° Many courts, including the Arkansas Supreme
Court, have held that they are enforceable. 41 Other courts have held
that such clauses are unenforceable on the theory that they violate
rules against the assignability of personal injury claims.4 2 Courts
following a third approach have held that a traditionally phrased
subrogation clause is enforceable against both the insured and a
third-party tort-feasor, but that a clause purporting to grant rights
in the proceeds of a settlement or judgment is only enforceable as
if it were a claim to proceeds.4 3
Even in jurisdictions holding that subrogation clauses in medical
and health insurance contracts are enforceable, equitable doctrines
may be applied to protect the insured from unjust results. 4 Some
courts accomplish this by applying equitable doctrines to determine
the priority between the insured and the insurer in proceeds from
settlements or judgments against a third-party tort-feasor.4 5 Courts
37. J. Kent Miller, Subrogation: Principles and Practice Pointers, 20 COLO.
LAW. 11, 20 (1991).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. KEETON & WIDiss, supra note 13, § 3.10(a)(7).
41. See Sentry Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 246 Ark. 680, 687, 439 S.W.2d 797, 801
(1969); see also Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 362 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Ohio 1977);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 245 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1976); State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 450 P.2d 458, 459 (Utah 1969).
42. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(a)(7); see also State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Knapp, 484 P.2d 180, 181 (Ariz. 1971); Peller v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42-43 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
43. KEETON & WwIss, supra note 13, § 3.10(a)(7). Clauses that purport to grant
rights in the proceeds of a settlement or judgment are usually designed to circumvent
rules prohibiting the assignment of personal injury claims. Because such a claim
is enforceable only as a claim to proceeds, it is not enforceable as a claim against
the tort-feasor for violation of the subrogee's rights by settling with the insured
after notice of these rights. Id.
44. See Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1990); Morin
v. Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1974); Westendorf v.
Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1983).
45. Powell, 581 So. 2d at 776-77.
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:475
have developed five 46 approaches based on equitable doctrines to
determine these priorities. 47
The majority of courts follow an approach in which the insured
is entitled to the proceeds up to the amount necessary to compensate
him for any losses not paid by the insurer.48 Whatever remains after
the insured is made whole is then distributed to the insurer up to
the amount paid by it pursuant to the contract. 49 Any excess is then
paid to the insured so that any windfall is retained by the insured. 0
The minority approach allows the insurer a priority claim to
any proceeds collected from the third party. 51 This priority claim is
limited to the amount paid under the insurance policy, and the
insured retains all proceeds in excess of the amount paid by the
insurer. 2 The insurer is reimbursed even if the insured has not been
made whole for his injuries by the tort-feasor.1 This approach is
based on the premise that no inequity results from a contract freely
46. Although Keeton only lists three in his text, two other approaches are
outlined in a footnote. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b)(1), at 234 n.l.
47. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b).
48. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b); see also Powell, 581 So. 2d
at 778; Allum v. MedCenter Health Care, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985); Skauge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 565 P.2d 628, 632
(Mont. 1977); Wimberly v. American Casualty Co., 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn.
1979); Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Wis.
1982); Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Wis. 1977). For
example, the insured incurs a $100,000 total loss for personal injury sustained in
a car accident. This $100,000 figure is composed of medical bills, lost wages, any
permanent or partial disability, and pain and suffering. Assume that $50,000 of
that figure is for medical bills which were paid in full by the insured's health
insurer who retains a subrogation right pursuant to the policy. Assume further
that the insured recovers $50,000, the policy limit, from the tortfeasor. The health
insurer would not be entitled to subrogation because the insured did not receive
more than the amount needed to make him whole for the loss. His total loss was
$100,000 and his total recovery was $100,000.
49. KEETON & Wmisss, supra note 13, § 3.10(b); see also Frost v. Porter Leasing
Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387, 388-89 (Mass. 1982); Union Ins. Soc. v. Consolidated Ice
Co., 245 N.W. 563, .564 (Mich. 1932); Thiringer v. American Motors Ins. Co.,
588 P.2d 191, 193 (Wash. 1978)(en banc).
50. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b); see also Yorkshire Ins. Co. v.
Nisbet Shipping Co., 2 Q.B. 330, 336 (1960).
51. Ross, supra note 7, at 72; see also Higginbotham, 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d
464 (1993); Culver v. Insurance Co. of North America, 559 A.2d 400, 403 (N.J.
1989); Peterson v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 191 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ohio 1963).
Assume the same facts and dollar figures as in the previous example discussed
supra note 48. Assume further that the insured recovers $50,000, the policy limit,
from the tort-feasor's insurer. The health insurer would be entitled to the entire
$50,000 received from the tort-feasor, as the insurer had paid $50,000 in medical
bills. This leaves the insured with nothing. This is the approach adopted by Arkansas.
52. KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 13, § 3.10(b).
53. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b).
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entered into by the parties where the rights of each are clearly
delineated 4
Three other approaches have been adopted by a few courts."
The first of these approaches is to pro rate the proceeds between
the insurer and the insured based on the percentage of the total
original loss for which the insurer indemnified the insured under
the policy.5 6 Courts following a second approach hold that the insurer
owns the claim against the third party and is entitled to the full
amount of the proceeds even if they exceed the amount paid by
the insurer.17 In the third approach, subrogation is rejected completely
and the insured, as sole owner of the claim, is allowed to collect
from both the insurer and the third-party tort-feasor.5
B. The Development of Insurance Subrogation in Arkansas
The validity of subrogation clauses in medical insurance contracts
in Arkansas was first upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Shipley v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co.,5 9 in which the court
adopted the view that subrogation clauses in medical and health
insurance contracts are valid and enforceable.w In Shipley, the insured,
his wife, and two grandchildren were injured in a car accident caused
by the negligence of another driver. 6' Even though Shipley's personal
automobile policy provided for reimbursement of medical expenses
54. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b); see also Higginbotham, 312
Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d 464 (1993); Powell, 581 So. 2d 772, 784-85 (Ala. 1990)(Maddox,
J., dissenting).
55. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.10(b).
56. KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 13, § 3.10(b); see also Dimick v. Lewis, 497
A.2d 1221, 1224 (N.H. 1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 527 A.2d 1021, 1024
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Scales v. Skagit County Medical Bureau, 491 P.2d 1338,
1340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). Assume the same facts and dollar figures as in the
previous example discussed supra note 48. Under this approach the health insurer
would only be entitled to $25,000 since the insured was only able to recover one-
half of the value of the total loss from the tort-feasor, $50,000 of a $100,000 total
loss.
57. KEETON AND WrDiss, supra note 13, § 3.10(b), at 234 n.1; see Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 146 N.E. 377, 378 (N.Y. 1925). Assume the
same facts and dollar figures as in the previous example discussed supra note 48.
The health insurer would be entitled to the entire $50,000 or even more if the
tort-feasor's policy limits had been greater than $50,000.
58. KEETON & WmDiss, supra note 13, § 3.10(b), at 234 n.1. Assume the same
facts and dollar figures as in the previous example discussed supra note 48. The
health insurer would be entitled to nothing and the insured would be entitled to
$50,000 or more if the tort-feasor's policy limits had been greater than $50,000.
59. 244 Ark. 1159, 428 S.W.2d 268 (1968).
60. Id. at 1162, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
61. Id. at 1160, 428 S.W.2d at 269.
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up to $500.00 per person, 62 Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company
(hereinafter "Northwestern") never made any payments to Shipley. 3
Shipley recovered a sum from the at-fault party that the court deemed
sufficient to fully reimburse him for all the medical bills he had
paid as a result of the accident. 64 Shipley then sued Northwestern
to recover payment of the medical bills. 65 Northwestern asserted that
it was not obligated to make any payments to Shipley since his
insurance policy with Northwestern contained a subrogation clause
and he had been fully compensated by the at-fault party. 66 The
Arkansas Supreme Court held that, because Shipley had been paid
in full for the medical bills and because Northwestern had a valid
subrogation clause in the insurance contract, Shipley could not recover
from Northwestern. 67 This decision established that subrogation clauses
in medical insurance contracts are valid and enforceable in Arkansas. 6
Because the insurance contract in Shipley contained a subrogation
clause, the court was not required to decide whether the right to
subrogation was based on conventional or legal subrogation. 69
The distinction between legal and conventional subrogation was
also not addressed by the Court of Appeals of Arkansas when it
reaffirmed the validity of subrogation clauses and extended their
effect to those not in privity with the insurer by applying Arkansas
contract law in Storey v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield.70 In
Storey, the policyholder's daughter was injured in an automobile
accident. 71 The insurer paid $3,234.05 of the daughter's medical bills
under the policy, 72 and her father settled with one of two tort-
feasors. 73 The insurer claimed that, under its subrogation clause, it
was entitled to repayment of the amounts it had paid. 74 Storey
argued that, although she had accepted benefits and may have been
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1161, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
64. Id. at 1162, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
65. Id. at 1161, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
66. Id. The essence of the subrogation agreement was that "the insurer would
be subrogated to any right possessed by the insured to reimbursement of medical
expenses from a third party." Id. at 1162, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
67. Id. at 1161, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1162, 428 S.W.2d at 270.
70. 17 Ark. App. 112, 704 S.W.2d 176 (1986).
71. Id. at 113, 704 S.W.2d at 176.
72. Id. at 115, 704 S.W.2d at 178.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 113-14, 704 S.W.2d at 177. It should be noted that the subrogation
clause in this case was identical to that in Higginbotham. Higginbotham, 312 Ark.
at 201, 849 S.W.2d at 465.
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bound by some provisions of the health insurance contract, she did
not have to honor the subrogation clause because there was no
privity of contract.75 In holding that Storey was bound by the
contract, the court relied on the principle of Arkansas contract law
that a party cannot avoid obligations under a contract where she
has accepted benefits under the document. 76 Although this decision
did not specifically adopt the view that subrogation clauses in health
insurance contracts are governed exclusively by contract law and not
affected by equitable doctrines, the fact that the decision was based
solely on contract law principles foreshadowed the holding in
Higginbotham.77
When the Arkansas Supreme Court did address the distinction
between legal and conventional subrogation, it limited the application
of subrogation to those instances where the medical or health insurance
contract contains a clause that specifically provides for subrogation. 78
In American Pioneer Life Insurance Co. v. Rogers,79 the court clearly
established that subrogation in medical and health insurance contracts
in Arkansas exists only by conventional subrogation and that legal
subrogation is not available in the health insurance context.80 The
distinction was important in American because the defendants, the
Rogers, were insured under a major medical insurance policy issued
by American Pioneer Life Insurance Company (hereinafter
"American") 8' that did not contain a subrogation clause. 2 Roger's
daughter, a minor, was seriously injured in an automobile accident. 83
When Rogers filed a claim under the policy on behalf of his daughter,
American requested that he complete and sign a standard subrogation
form.8 4 Even though Rogers refused to do so, American paid the
claim. 85 After Rogers recovered from the third-party tort-feasor,
American filed suit seeking to assert its subrogation rights. 86 The
trial court denied American's claim because the policy did not expressly
75. Storey, 17 Ark. App. at 114, 704 S.W.2d at 177.
76. Id. at 114-15, 704 S.W.2d at 177.
77. Id.
78. American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ark. 254, 753 S.W.2d 530
(1988).
79. 296 Ark. 254, 753 S.W.2d 530 (1988).
80. Id. at 259, 753 S.W.2d at 533.
81. Id. at 254, 753 S.W.2d at 530.
82. Id. at 254-55, 753 S.W.2d at 530.
83. Id. at 254, 753 S.W.2d at 530.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 255, 753 S.W.2d at 530.
86. Id.
1994]
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provide for subrogation.87 In affirming the trial court's decision, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that a medical expense insurance
carrier does not have the right to share in the settlement or recovery
from a third party unless the insurance contract contains a specific
subrogation clause."' In this decision, the court specifically rejected
legal subrogation in health insurance cases and held that only
conventional subrogation could provide a basis for reimbursement.8 9
This view was modified somewhat in a more recent case, Shelter
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bough,9° in which the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that subrogation can also arise by operation of statute
and be affected by equitable doctrines. 9' The dispute in Bough arose
when Bough was injured in an automobile accident as a result of
a third party's negligence. 92 Although the car Bough was driving
belonged to his mother and stepfather, he was covered by his parents'
no-fault insurance policy with Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
(hereinafter "Shelter"). 93 Shelter paid $11,960.00 under the medical
payments and wage loss provisions of the insurance contract, and
Bough settled with the third party's insurer for its policy limit of
$25,000.00 and executed a release covering both the insurer and the
tort-feasor.94 The payments he received, however, were insufficient
to fully compensate Bough, so he successfully sued Shelter for
benefits under implied underinsured motorist coverage. 95
The trial court allowed Shelter to deduct from Bough's recovery
both the amounts paid by it and the third party's insurer as subrogation
rights pursuant to Arkansas law. 96 Bough argued on cross appeal
that Arkansas law only provides subrogation for benefits recovered
in tort, and, since the underinsured motorist benefits were contractual
in nature, Shelter should only have been allowed to offset the
87. Id.
88. Id. at 259, 753 S.W.2d at 533.
89. Id.
90. 310 Ark. 21, 834 S.W.2d 637 (1992).
91. Id. at 28-29, 834 S.W.2d at 641-42.
92. Id. at 23, 834 S.W.2d at 638.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Bough's parents did not have underinsured coverage, but Bough sued
Shelter alleging that Shelter violated ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-209 (Michie Supp.
1993) by not offering underinsured coverage to his parents. Bough, 310 Ark. at
23, 834 S.W.2d at 638. The court determined that Shelter did violate ARK. CODE
ANN. § 23-89-209, and it entered a directed verdict for Bough which implied
underinsured coverage to him. 310 Ark. at 23, 834 S.W.2d at 638. The issue of
damages then went to a jury which decided that Bough was entitled to a total of
$85,000 as compensation for his injuries. Id.
96. 310 Ark. at 24, 834 S.W.2d at 639 (interpreting ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-
89-209).
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$11,960.00 it had paid against the $25,000.00 recovered from the
tort-feasor's insurer. 97 He further argued that $25,000.00 was
insufficient to fully compensate him for his damages, and Shelter,
thus, had no right of subrogation. 9
In upholding Shelter's right of subrogation, the Arkansas Supreme
Court indicated that equitable doctrines would apply in determining
whether subrogation is appropriate. 99 The court also acknowledged
the general rule that an insured must be made whole before an
insurer can assert its subrogation rights.'00 It found, however, that
it was not required to decide the issue because of its holding that
Bough's successful claim against Shelter made him whole.' 0' The
court declined to draw the distinction urged by Bough between
contractual and tort benefits in deciding whether Bough had been
made whole. Instead it held that, since subrogation was equitable
in nature and designed to prevent double recovery by the insured,
the insurer should be allowed to assert its right of subrogation if
the insured has been made whole for his injuries. 10 2
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
On March 1, 1993 the Arkansas Supreme Court held, in
Higginbotham v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield,03 that a clear
and unambiguous subrogation clause in a health insurance contract
entitled the insurer to subrogation even before the insured was made
whole. 104 The court began its analysis with a discussion of the
similarities between Storey and Higginbotham. 5 The court quoted
the portion of the Storey opinion that stated that Storey was entitled
to benefits pursuant to her father's contract with Blue Cross and
that, after making these payments, Blue Cross was entitled to
97. Id. at 27-28, 834 S.W.2d at 640-41 (interpreting ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-
207(a)).
98. Id. at 28, 834 S.W.2d at 641.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. If subrogation had been denied to Shelter, Bough would have recovered
$11,960.00 in addition to the $85,000.00 in damages determined by the jury.
103. 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d 464 (1993).
104. Id. at 202-04, 849 S.W.2d at 466-67.
105. Id. at 201, 849 S.W.2d at 465. The subrogation clause at issue in Storey
was identical to the provision involved in Higginbotham. Both Higginbotham and
Storey involved children of public school employees; also, both cases concerned
settlements with third parties reached without the consent of Blue Cross and without
Blue Cross agreeing to release the carrier and tort-feasor from further liability. Id.
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subrogation under the same contract. 106 The court also noted that,
while Storey could have refused the benefits, she declined to do
so. 10 7 The court then stated the rule announced in Storey that the
settlement amount was not relevant to the determination of whether
the appellee had a right to reimbursement under the contract. 0 8
However, the court did not rely on the rationale in Storey to decide
Higginbotham.109
The majority opinion conceded that there was support for
Higginbotham's position from other jurisdictions, but declined to
follow them. 10 The court first discussed cases representing the majority
view that subrogation is an equitable remedy and that equitable
principles prevail even when there are contract provisions expressly
providing for subrogation." These cases held that the insured must
be made whole for the total loss before the insurer can recover
from any funds received by the insured. 112
While acknowledging the merit of the majority approach, the
court rejected it and adopted the minority position which holds that
subrogation principles do not override the right to contract." 3 The
court then held that the subrogation clause in Higginbotham's
insurance policy was clear and unambiguous." 4 In distinguishing
Higginbotham from Bough, the court dismissed as dictum the portion
of the opinion in Bough indicating that subrogation is only available
after a party has been made whole." 5
The court stated that this excerpt was dictum and that the
disputed issue in Bough was whether Shelter had made underinsured
106. Id. at 201-02, 849 S.W.2d at 465-66 (quoting Storey, 17 Ark. App. at 115,
704 S.W.2d at 177).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 202, 849 S.W.2d at 466 (quoting Storey, 17 Ark. App. at 115, 704
S. , ."d at 1.77-78.
109. Id. at 202, 849 S.W.2d at 466.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Powell v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 581 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 1990);
Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1982)).
112. Id. at 202, 849 S.W.2d at 466.
113. Id. (citing Culver v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 559 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1989);
Powell, 581 So. 2d 772, 783-88 (Maddox, J., dissenting); Powell, 581 So. 2d 772,
788-92 (Houston, J., dissenting); Rimes, 316 N.W.2d 348, 359-62 (Wis. 1982)
(Steinmetz, J., dissenting)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 203, 849 S.W.2d at 466. The relevant portion of the Bough opinion
states:
"[W]hile the general rule is that an insurer is not entitled to subrogation
unless the insured has been made whole for his loss, the insurer should
not be precluded from employing its right of subrogation when the insured
has been fully compensated and is in a position where the insured will
recover twice for some of his or her damages."
Id. (quoting Bough, 310 Ark. at 28, 834 S.W.2d at 641 (1992)).
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benefits available and whether Bough's release had prejudiced
Shelter. 16 The court went on to state that equitable principles are
appropriate to the doctrine of subrogation by operation of law, but
not to conventional subrogation. 1 7 The court held that there is no
reason why broad equitable principles should dominate clear
contractual provisions absent public policy considerations." 8 The
court concluded that there were no public policy considerations
supporting Higginbotham's position." 9 The final authority relied
upon by the court in the majority opinion was Standard Life &
Accident Insurance Co. v. Ward, 20 which held that the courts do
not have the right to make contracts for parties nor to modify the
contracts to fulfill some notion of abstract justice or moral
obligation. 121
B. Dissenting and Concurring Opinions
In his dissent, Justice Glaze asserted that the holding in
Higginbotham was clearly in conflict with the recent holding in
Bough.122 He stated that, in Bough, the court had adopted the
general rule that subrogation is available to the insurer only if the
amount recovered from the third-party tort-feasor and the insurer
exceeds the insured's loss. 23 He then cited two treatises in support
of the rule that the insured must be made whole before the insurer's
right to subrogation arises.12
Justice Glaze reiterated the fact that, while Higginbotham's total
damages amounted to at least $60,000.00, he received only $11,482.08
from Blue Cross and $25,000.00 from the negligent party's insurance. 25
Justice Glaze stated that there was no proof reflecting that the
116. Id.
117. Id. In conventional subrogation, an insurer's subrogation right arises from
a clause in the insurance policy or settlement agreement which expressly provides
for it. KEETON & WmIss, supra note 13, § 3.10(a). By contrast, legal subrogation
is based solely on equitable principles in the absence of any contractual provision.
COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:2.
118. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 203, 849 S.W.2d at 466.
119. Id.
120. 65 Ark. 295, 45 S.W. 1065 (1898).
121. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 204, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (quoting Standard Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Ward, 65 Ark. 295, 298, 45 S.W. 1065, 1066 (1898)).
122. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting); see Bough, 310 Ark. at 21, 834 S.W.2d at 637.
123. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 204-05, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (citing 6A JOHN
A. APPLEmAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4095 (Supp. 1992);
GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61:20 (2d ed. 1983)).
125. Id. at 205, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
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$36,482.08 payment would fully compensate Higginbotham for his
entire loss. 2 6
Justice Glaze also attacked the majority's attempt to distinguish
between legal and conventional subrogation.' 2 He cited Garrity v.
Rural Mutual Insurance Co. 12 8 as support for the theory that the
distinction between legal and conventional subrogation is irrelevant
in determining whether subrogation will be allowed because all
subrogation rests upon equitable principles. 29
Justice Glaze cited a line of cases supporting the proposition
that the insured must recover enough to cover his loss before the
insurer has a right to share in the proceeds of the recovery. 30 In
conclusion, Justice Glaze stated that the rule adopted in Bough was
applicable to the current situation and that the trial court's decision
should have been reversed.'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brown simply stated that Blue
Cross should only recover the amount it paid Higginbotham for
medical care due to personal injury. 3 2 He also stated that it was
impossible to determine exactly what injury was compensated by the
State Farm liability payment of $25,000.00.'"1 Had Higginbotham
shown that part of the State Farm benefits were for damages other
than medical treatment, Justice Brown, due to public policy reasons,
would have disallowed subrogation for any portion of the benefits
which were paid for nonmedical damages. 34 Justice Brown suggested
that, because this was not done, perhaps both parties understood
that the liability coverage applied only to bodily injury."'
V. SIGNIFICANCE
As a result of the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hig-
ginbotham, many injured parties may now receive less than full
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 253 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1977).
129. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 205, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (citing Garrity v. Rural
Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Wis. 1977)).
130. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 205, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (Glaze, J., dissenting)
(citing Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 262 N.E.2d 618 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970); Maryland Casualty v. Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago & St. L. Ry. Co., 124
N.E. 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 1919); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 171 A.2d
120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
480 P.2d 739 (Utah 1971)).
131. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 204, 849 S.W.2d at 467 (Brown, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 204, 849 S.W.2d at 468.
135. Id.
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compensation for the injuries incurred as a result of another party's
negligence if the at-fault party has insufficient insurance to cover
all damages and the injured individual's health insurance contract
provides for subrogation. While this rule may seem harsh and unfair,
it reflects legitimate judicial respect for the rights of individuals to
contract as they see fit. 3 6
The true significance of Higginbotham, however, lies not in
academic speculation about possible ramifications on the right of
an individual to contract, but in the very real effects forecast by
those espousing the view that subrogation is equitable in nature even
if provided for by contract. 13 7 Those who urge a result contrary to
the court's decision in Higginbotham emphasize that most insurance
subscribers lack the sophistication and bargaining power to negotiate
the individual terms of their contracts. The insurance contracts
available to consumers are almost always adhesion contracts. 3 ' This
leaves most individuals without any meaningful choice in contracting
for insurance coverage. Since most insurance contracts in Arkansas
have language similar to that used by Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue
Shield in its contract with Higginbotham, Arkansans may not have
an opportunity to avoid the hardships Higginbotham encountered.3 9
The idealist may speculate that this will result in lower premiums
because of the substantial savings insurance companies are likely to
realize as a result of the elimination of double recovery which will
result from the Higginbotham decision. The cynic, however, will
view this decision as simply another instance of a large corporation
increasing its profits at the expense of the injured victim whose
expectations in signing the insurance contract and paying the prem-
iums due under it were that she would be fully compensated for
any injuries she might incur.
The court's decision in Higginbotham may create another prob-
lem in that it will remove part of the incentive for the insured to
hire an attorney and pursue a claim for personal injury damages.
Depending on the amount of third-party coverage available and the
amount of medical benefits that have been paid, the insured may
be left with little or nothing for her efforts. Meanwhile, the medical
carrier reaps the benefit of contractual subrogation without assisting
136. Id. at 203-04, 849 S.W.2d at 466-67.
137. COUCH, supra note 11, § 61:20.
138. David L. Leitner, Enforcing the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations" in
Interpreting Insurance Contracts: A Doctrine in Search of Coherent Definition, 38
FED'N OF INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 379, 380 (1988).
139. Telephone Interview with John Shields, Director of Life & Health Division,
Arkansas Insurance Commission (Mar. 9, 1994).
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in any litigation. This defeats one of the primary purposes behind
the tort recovery system by denying full compensation to the injured
victim. Indeed, in many cases where the tort-feasor is underinsured,
there will be no incentive for the insured to even attempt to recover
from the tort-feasor. '
It is important to note that Higginbotham does not completely
foreclose the possibility that an individual in Higginbotham's position
could retain the proceeds of a settlement with the tort-feasor's insurer.
The narrow scope of the majority holding and the concurring and
dissenting opinions suggest that options may be available for others
faced with inadequate recovery for personal injuries.14'
One option may be for the policyholder to compromise with
the subrogating carrier prior to settling the claim with the tort-
feasor's insurance company. In light of the holding in Higginbotham,
a plaintiff's attorney may have little to bargain with other than by
convincing the medical carrier that a settlement with discounted
subrogation is preferable to the risk of trial and the potential for
the plaintiff (and accordingly the health carrier) to lose.
Another possibility is to allocate amounts in the settlement
documents to damages not covered by the subrogation clause. Justice
Brown suggests this option in his concurring opinion when he states
that "[hiad the appellant shown that part of the State Farm benefits
were for damages other than for medical treatment, I [Justice Brown]
would disallow subrogation for the non-medical portion of the ben-
efits paid for public policy reasons."' 142 While Higginbotham still
would have had only four Justices favoring his position, it is likely
that a proper case might receive a majority decision in favor of the
victim. As a condition of settlement, Higginbotham could have
required that State Farm allocate the $25,000.00 as payment for
pain and suffering only. This might have convinced the court to
deny Blue Cross subrogation to the settlement proceeds.
Other options would have been to allocate the settlement to
lost wages or to a loss of consortium claim if the victim were
married. Although this method has not received judicial approval
140. Contrast this with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation statutes. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-410(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) guarantees a minimum amount of
compensation to the injured employee. After reasonable costs of collection are
deducted from the settlement, a minimum of one third of the remainder of the
settlement goes to the injured employee or his dependents. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1 -
9-410(a)(2)(B) (Michie Supp. 1993).
141. Higginbotham, 312 Ark. at 203-05, 849 S.W.2d at 466-68.
142. Id. at 204, 849 S.W.2d at 468 (Brown, J., concurring).
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by the Arkansas Supreme Court, 143 it may be the only method which
will convince the court to deny subrogation and allow a victim to
be made whole. One barrier practitioners may encounter, however,
is that insurance companies may not be cooperative in wording
settlement documents to benefit victims. A final option would be
to seek allocation of damages by the trial court, with or without
the participation of the medical carrier. This option might be pre-
ferred over self-serving language in settlement documents which are
arguably only a thinly-veiled attempt to circumvent contractual lan-
guage.
The repercussions of the decision in Higginbotham remain un-
certain. Three weeks after its decision in Higginbotham, the Arkansas
Supreme Court decided Conley Transport, Inc. v. Great American
Insurance Co.'" In Conley the court denied subrogation recovery
to an insurer on the grounds that the settlement by Conley with
the at-fault party's insurer did not violate the contract with Great
American. 145 Although the decision was predicated on contract prin-
ciples, the factual situation in Conley was similar to that in Hig-
ginbotham.'"4 The seemingly contradictory holding in Conley indicates
that the Arkansas Supreme Court may be vacillating on the issue.
In fact, Justices Glaze and Brown, while concurring in the judgment,
indicated that they would have decided the case on the grounds that
Conley had not been made whole. 47
When all the ramifications of Higginbotham are considered, it
seems that there is now more uncertainty in insurance law than ever
before. The prudent practitioner who represents a tort victim will
143. Such an allocation was attempted in Arkansas State Employees Ins. Comm'n
v. Manning, 316 Ark. 143, 870 S.W.2d 748 (1994), but the Arkansas Supreme
Court did not rule on the substantive arguments presented due to a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction in the lower court. Id. at 146, 870 S.W.2d at 749.
144. 312 Ark. 317, 849 S.W.2d 494 (1993). In Conley the principle issue was
whether or not the insured had breached the subrogation provision of his insurer's
physical damage policy by settling with the tort-feasor and executing a release. The
court decided that the $10,000 settlement was not for physical damage but was
for lost net income, although this was not specified in any of the settlement
documents. Id. at 329, 849 S.W.2d at 495.
145. Id. at 320, 849 S.W.2d at 496.
146. Higginbotham and Conley are similar in that they both involved situations
where the insured settled with the third-parties' liability carriers without approval
from their own insurance carriers. The insurance companies claimed that they were
entitled to reimbursement for payments they had made pursuant to the subrogation
clauses, and in both cases it was unclear exactly what the payments from the third-
party liability carriers encompassed. See Higginbotham, 312 Ark. 199, 849 S.W.2d
464; Conley, 312 Ark. 317, 849 S.W.2d 494.
147. Conley, 312 Ark. at 320-21, 849 S.W.2d at 496 (Glaze, J., concurring);
Conley, 312 Ark. at 321-22, 849 S.W.2d at 496-97 (Brown, J., concurring).
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carefully examine the possible effects of subrogation before settling
any third-party claim. Until the Arkansas Supreme Court issues a
more definitive ruling on the matter, perhaps the safest course for
the attorney to pursue is to compromise with the subrogating carrier
prior to settling with the tort-feasor's insurance company.
Paul R. Thomson III
